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Abstract
The paper jointly models the evolution of compliance with regulation and
the evolution of a CPR stock, by combining replicator dynamics describing
compliance with harvesting rules, with resource stock dynamics. This evolu-
tionary approach suggests that coexistence, in long run equilibrium, of both
cooperative and non-cooperative rules under regulation is possible. Stock ef-
fects on proﬁts and a certain structure of auditing probabilities could imply
the emergence of a limit cycle in areas of low stock levels, as an equilibrium
outcome for compliance and the biomass stock. It might be easier for the
regulator to obtain full compliance under precommitment to ﬁxed auditing
probabilities.
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11 Introduction
Common pool resources (CPR) can be described as stocks of natural capital
that generate ﬂows of useful goods and services to humans2 and share two
main characteristics:
1. It is costly to exclude individuals from beneﬁting from the ﬂows of
goods and services associated with the resource stocks.
2. Once a resource unit is harvested from the CPR by an individual, this
unit is not available to other individuals. This is the substractability
property.
Design of institutions to exclude potential beneﬁciaries from harvesting
the resource is not easy, thus many CPR have open access characteristics.3
As is well known in the analysis of open access resources, a negative appropri-
ation externality stems from the fact that individual harvesting ignores the
impact of individual harvesting on ther e s o u r c es t o c k .I nh a r v e s t i n gaC P R ,
individual appropriators could, in the absence of appropriate institutions, en-
gage in “scramble competition” to appropriate the resource before someone
else does and ignore the impact of their actions on the resource stock. For
example, in a ﬁshery, individual harvesting reduces stocks and increases unit
harvesting costs for all appropriators. In groundwater management, individ-
ual pumping reduces the water head and increases unit pumping costs for all
individuals. The non-cooperative outcome obtained when each appropriator
maximizes individual beneﬁts without taking into account the negative ap-
propriation externality is Pareto inferior to a cooperative outcome where total
beneﬁts are maximized and in this way the externality is internalized.4 This
non-cooperative outcome can be associated with historical resource overex-
ploitation and collapses of stocks.5
The overexploitation of a CPR leads to the need for a regulatory frame-
work.6 In a ﬁshery, probably the most well-studied case, at a theoretical
level, optimal regulation can be designed by comparing the non-cooperative
2See, for example, Ostrom, Gardner and Walker (1993).
3A CPR is typically associated with a ﬁxed number of potential beneﬁciaries or users,
while for an open access resource this restriction does apply.
4There is extensive literature on this issue. See, for example, Gordon (1954), Harding
(1968) for the “tragedy of the commons,” Smith (1968), Negri (1989), Clark (1990) and
Ostrom (1993).
5See Jackson et al. (2001). Also, FAO estimates that currently 71 - 78 percent of ﬁsh
stocks are fully exploited, overexploited or recovering from depletion.
6In the absence of regulation, and given that the appropriation externality appears as
stock eﬀects in harvesting costs, the appropriators’ eﬀort or harvesting will be higher, the
2ﬁshing eﬀort with the corresponding cooperative eﬀort and then using in-
struments to achieve the cooperative outcome. In practice, such instruments
include limits on entry, gear restrictions, area closures, seasonal restrictions,
individual transferable quotas (ITQ), total allowable catch (TAC), quotas
for important species, minimum landing size, minimum mesh size, by-catch
rules, and landing fees.7 A typical property of the economic instruments
is that they can sustain decentralized regulation. That is, once they are
properly enforced and monitored, the individual appropriators follow the co-
operative behavior dictated by the regulation, and the system converges to
the desired socially-optimal steady state.
Of course it is not realistic to assume that all agents will follow regulation,
especially if the number of agents is large. In ﬁshery management there is
a tendency to support the idea that regulation has diﬃculties in protecting
ﬁsheries from overexploitation. This opinion is supported by real evidence
regarding quota busting, data fouling and in general noncompliance behav-
ior.8 In particular, typical violations of regulations involve illegal catches
or landings, misreporting landings, violation of by-catches rules, discards of
ﬁsh, ﬁshing without a licence, landing of protected stocks, or misreported
catch areas.9
The behavior of a ﬁsher regarding compliance or noncompliance can be
modeled by following Becker’s (1968) general approach, under which a ﬁsher
will decide to comply or not by comparing expected beneﬁts from noncompli-
ance, including any expected penalty if audited, with the expected beneﬁts
from compliance. Compliance behavior in CPRs has also been modelled, fol-
lowing mainly Ostrom (1990), in the context of institution formation within
the appropriators of the CPR, that allows the imposition of sanctions on
noncompliers. Sethi and Somanathan (1996) consider the evolution of social
norms for CPR and show that cooperative behavior guided by norms of re-
straint and punishment may be a stable outcome of an evolutionary process,
against non-cooperative behavior.
In the present paper compliance or noncompliance, or equivalently the
decision to follow the cooperative or the non-cooperative harvesting rule,
is modelled by assuming that appropriators are expected to choose their
less the individuals take into account the eﬀects of their actions on total stocks. If stock
eﬀects are completely ignored, in the sense that the appropriators are myopic and treat
t h er e s o u r c es t o c ka saﬁxed parameter, then individual harvesting, at least in the short
run, will be set at the maximum possible level relative to the cooperative rule.
7See, for example, Conrad and Clark (1987), Clark (1990), and Homans and Wilen
(1997).
8See, for example, Nielsen and Mathiesen (2003).
9For example, Jensen and Vestergaard (2002), Eggert and Ellegard (2003).
3harvesting rule in an evolutionary way by considering the evolution of their
proﬁts and by taking into account the probability of paying a ﬁne if audited
and found not to be in compliance with regulation. This type of rule can
be associated with a process, noted by Ostrom (1990), which indicates that
"the most one can say is that individuals ... are engaged in a trial-and-error
eﬀort to learn more about the results of their actions so that they can evaluate
beneﬁts and costs more eﬀectively over time". Proﬁts in general are aﬀected
by the deviation between harvesting levels with or without compliance, by
stock eﬀects on unit costs, since these eﬀects are eventually most likely to be
realized in a dynamic context, by the size of the probabilistic ﬁne and by the
probability of been audited. If following the non-cooperative strategy implies
proﬁt reduction relative to the average proﬁts of the appropriators’ group,
the appropriator will choose the cooperative strategy and vice-versa. Since a
CPR with a ﬁxed large number of appropriators and two possible strategies
is examined, this evolutionary assumption implies that a replicator dynamics
framework should be adopted to describe the evolution of appropriator shares
that follow cooperative or non-cooperative strategies.10 The steady-state
equilibrium resource level and harvesting rule will be the outcome of this
evolutionary process. Thus the evolution of harvesting rules could in principle
lead to full adoption of a single rule (cooperative or non-cooperative), or
equivalently full compliance or not, but also coexistence of both rules in
equilibrium, that is partial compliance. Once the mechanism resulting in
no compliance or partial compliance is characterized, regulation could be
adjusted in order to steer the system towards the adoption of the cooperative
rule, or full compliance.
Therefore the contribution of this paper lies in that it models jointly the
evolution of compliance to regulation and the evolution of the CPR stock
in the context of an evolutionary process emerging from combining replica-
tor dynamics, which describe the adoption of harvesting rules, with resource
stock dynamics. This evolutionary approach characterizes the emergence of
steady-state equilibrium harvesting rules or compliance levels under regula-
tion, and the corresponding behavior of the steady-state equilibrium resource
stock. Thus the present paper does not seek to model the evolution of insti-
tutions or social norms in CPR harvesting, but rather to model the outcome
of regulation. This outcome is analyzed in terms of compliance levels and
resource stock, when decisions to comply or not are taken in an evolutionary
way, based on the evolution of proﬁts associated with diﬀerent compliance
decisions among appropriators, over a suﬃciently long time period.
10For the use of the replicator dynamic methodology coupled with stock dynamics in a
CPR problem, see also Sethi and Somanathan (1996).
4This evolutionary approach suggests that coexistence of both coopera-
tive and non-cooperative rules under regulation is possible. It is shown that
stock eﬀects on proﬁts and a certain structure of auditing probabilities could
imply the emergence of a limit cycle in areas of low stock levels, as an equi-
librium outcome for the level of compliance and the biomass stock. Given
the observed ﬂuctuations in the biomass of ﬁsheries, and regulatory failures,
the evolutionary mechanism developed in this paper could be regarded as
explaining such periodic ﬂuctuations in stocks and levels of compliance.11 It
is also shown that it is possible to modify regulation, by modifying penalties
for regulatory violations, in order to attain full compliance equilibria and
take the system out of low stock traps, and that it might be easier for the
regulator to obtain the full compliance if there is precommitment to ﬁxed
auditing probabilities.
2H a r v e s t i n g R u l e s
We start by brieﬂy characterizing competitive (that is, non-cooperative) and
socially-optimal (that is, cooperative) harvesting rules for a CPR ﬁshery with
i =1 ,...,n appropriators.12 Let resource dynamics be described by




where hi denotes harvesting by harvester or appropriator i at time t, H
denotes total harvesting at time t, and F (S) is the biomass growth function
with the usual inverted “U” properties, F (0) = F (Smax)=0 ,F 0 (S0)=0 ,
F
00 (S) < 0 for 0 ≤ S ≤ Smax. As usual Smax denotes carrying capacity and
S0 the biomass level corresponding to maximum sustainable yield. Assuming
general nonlinear stock eﬀects and that individual harvesters face a ﬁxed
market price (for example, the world price) for the harvested resource, the
appropriator’s proﬁt ﬂow is determined as
πi = phi − ci (hi,S) (2)
The cost function is strictly convex and increasing in harvesting and de-
creasing in S due to stock eﬀects. In a non-cooperative equilibrium each
harvester maximizes proﬁts by considering the biomass stock as a ﬁxed para-
meter. Thus non-cooperative harvesting at each point in time is determined
11This of course does not diminish the importance of environmental factors in biomass
ﬂuctuations.



























It follows from the envelop theorem that the proﬁt function is positively









To deﬁne cooperative or socially-optimal harvesting, welfare from total
harvest H is deﬁned, assuming symmetry, as the sum of consumer and pro-
ducer surplus or U (H)=S (H) − nc(h,S), where S (H)=
R nh
0 P (u)du is
the area under the demand curve p = P (H) and S0 (H)=P (H)=p. The






−δt[S (H) − nc(h,S)]dt , H = nh s. t. (1) (6)
The current value Hamiltonian for this problem is deﬁned as
H =S (H) − nc(h,S)+µ[F (S) − H]
where the costate variable µ is interpreted as the resource stock shadow




















along with (1) and the transversality condition at inﬁn i t y .A si sc o m m o ni n
these problems, by diﬀerentiating (7) and substituting into (8), we determine
the dynamic ﬁshery system in the state - control space (S,h). Assume that
a steady-state equilibrium (S∗,H∗) exists, which has the usual saddle point
property, then the policy function H∗
t = Q(St) is determined by the stable
manifold converging to (S∗,H∗). The policy function can be used by the
regulator to design a socially-optimal quota system. The corresponding quota
for each harvester is then hC
t = H∗
t /n. This socially-optimal harvesting rule
hC is announced to the appropriators and they are expected to follow the
6rule, harvesting hC
t per period. Thus under optimal regulation the proﬁt







Therefore, the proﬁto rp a y o ﬀ function for each appropriator under non-












respectively. The harvesting rules, or harvesting strategies, are divergent in
the sense that for any given biomass stock S, and for µ>0, it holds that
hN >h C. It should be noted that πC ¡
hC,S
¢




eﬀects could be realized even through the socially-optimal rule, in the sense
that if stock is reduced, because say the majority of the appropriators do
not follow the socially-optimal rule, then proﬁts will fall, since the harvesters
that follow hC are trying to harvest this amount from lower stocks.
3 Replicator Dynamics and the Evolutionary
Adoption of Harvesting Rules




number of i =1 ,...,n harvesters, we seek to model the evolution of the
adoption of the harvesting rules and the interaction of this evolution with
the evolution of the resource biomass.13
Let the state vector x(t)=( xN (t),x C (t)) denote the share of the total
population of harvesters following non-cooperative or cooperative harvesting
rules respectively at time t. If a regulator follows the cooperative harvesting




the other hand a harvester can choose not to comply with regulation,14 that
is to follow the non-cooperative rule hN. In this case, if audited (caught),
s/he is liable for a ﬁne.
A harvester’s subjective probability of being audited can be deﬁned in a
general form by φ(z), where z is a vector of parameters. It is assumed that
13It should be noticed that what follows applies to any two distinct harvesting rules
independent of how they have been deﬁned. Non-cooperative and cooperative optimization
is used in order to deﬁne these rules, since this approach relates more to the traditional
regulation theory.
14Nielsen and Mathiesen (2003) report, regarding Danish ﬁshers, that conﬂicts in the
normal pattern of ﬁshing and the pattern of ﬁshing implied by regulation has a major
impact on their compliance behavior.
7this function is common for all harvesters. This probability can be further
speciﬁed by making additional assumptions.
In the ﬁrst case the regulator exercises ﬁxed monitoring eﬀort and makes
a ﬁxed number of inspections, say ¯ n p e rp e r i o d . I nd o i n gs ot h er e g u l a t o r
announces this policy and thus precommits to a certain auditing probability
which is known by the harvesters. The regulator sticks to the policy and the
harvesters know this policy. In this case the audit probability is ﬁxed, or15
φ(z) ≡ ¯ φ (11)
An alternative assumption would be that the regulator exercises variable
monitoring eﬀort, which depends on global variables of the problem that the
regulator can observe.16 One such variable is the resource stock S, another
variable is the share of violators v detected during an audit. The regulator
increases the monitoring eﬀort if the stock is reduced or the share of violators
increases. This policy can be regarded as a type of no full commitment - or
partial commitment - auditing policy on the regulator’s part. The regulator
might for example not audit individual harvesters if the stocks are suﬃciently
high, but the regulator might start inspecting if stocks fall below a certain
level.17 The harvesters are made aware of the results of the inspections,
say through public announcements and/or private communications,18 and
perceive that if the stock is reduced or the share of violators increases, more
eﬀort will be exercised and thus the subjective probability of being audited




(S) < 0, (φ(S
∗),φ(0)) > 0 (12)
If harvesters use the observed v as an estimate for their perceived xN, that




(xN) > 0,φ (1) > 0,φ(0) = 0 (13)
15This is a common assumption in the enforcement literature in environmental economics
(e.g. Malik, 1993; Garvie and Keeler, 1994; Segerson and Miceli, 1998; Stranlund and
Dhana, 1999).
16In the enforcement literature, variable monitoring eﬀort is usually related to ﬁrm
speciﬁc variables (e.g. Malik, 1990; VanEgteren and Weber, 1996).
17Grieson and Singh (1990), Khalil (1997), and Franckx (2002) analyze no commitment
frameworks. Franckx relates individual auditing to the level of ambient pollution which is
a global state variable. An environmental regulator chooses which ﬁrm to inspect without
observing ﬁrms’ action but after observing ambient pollution.
18In their survey Nielsen and Mathiesen (2003) report that " ﬁshers observe the activities
and movements of the enforcement agents and continuously report to their peers about it."
8It is expected that the value of φ(1) will be large but not unity since not
every harvester is audited even if nobody complies, while φ(0) = 0, since if
everybody is complying the subjective probability of paying the ﬁne is zero.
If (12) and (13) are taken together, a more general formulation for the
subjective audit probability with joint dependence on compliance and stocks
would be:
φ(z) ≡ φ(xN,S) (14)
In this framework the payoﬀ when the non-cooperative rule is followed,












where F > 0 is a ﬁxed penalty.19 Under these assumptions the average proﬁt
ﬂow associated with the CPR is deﬁned, using the fact that xN +xC =1 , as:















Suppose that in every time period dt each appropriator, say i, following a
certain strategy hN or hC, learns the proﬁt, and consequently the harvesting
strategy, of another randomly chosen appropriator, say j, with probability
αdt > 0.20 The appropriator will change his/her strategy to the other strategy
if s/he perceives that the other’s proﬁt is higher because s/he follows the
other harvesting strategy. The higher the diﬀerence between the payoﬀs, the
higher the probability that the appropriator will take it into account and
change his/her harvesting rule. The probability that an appropriator i using









for πtC > ΠtN
0 for πtC ≤ ΠtN
Following Gintis (2000) the expected proportion of the population following


































19In an empirical study of Danish ﬁshers, Nielsen and Mathiesen (2003) suggest that
among the major factors aﬀecting compliance in ﬁsheries are: (i) the economic gains to
be obtained from noncompliance, (ii) the risk of being detected and the severity of the
sanction. In (15) factor (i) is captured by the term πN ¡
hN,S
¢
, while factor (ii) is captured
by the term φ(z)F.
20See Gintis (2000) for use of this approach in order to derive the replicator dynamic.










tN − ¯ π
t¢
(18)
For a large population, Ex
t+dt
N can be replaced by x
t+dt
N , substracting xt
N
from both sides of (18), dividing by dt and taking the limit as dt → 0, and









tN − ¯ π
t¢
(19)
The replicator dynamic indicates that the share of harvesters following
non-cooperative harvesting rules increases over time if non-cooperative proﬁts
increase relative to average proﬁts and vice versa. The replicator dynamic
can be written, using the payoﬀ deﬁnitions and dropping t, as:















Replicator dynamics equation (20) describes the evolution of harvesters
that violate regulation. Since the evolution of the resource biomass is aﬀected
by the harvesting rule choice, its evolution will be determined by
˙ S = F (S) − n
£
xNh
N +( 1− xN)h
C¤
(21)
The dynamical system (20), (21) can be used to analyze the evolution
of harvesting rules and resource stock towards an evolutionary equilibrium,
that determines the share of appropriators following cooperative or non-
cooperative harvesting rules, and the resource biomass. The equilibrium
harvesting rule could be monomorphic if all harvesters are following the same
rule, or polymorphic if both cooperative and non-cooperative rules coexist
in equilibrium.22 Two possible cases are examined. In the ﬁrst proﬁts are
not aﬀected by changes in the stocks, while in the second stock eﬀects are
present so that a reduction in the resource stock reduces individual proﬁts.
4 Evolution of Harvesting Rules without Stock
Eﬀects
In analyzing the ﬁrst case we assume that harvesting rules have been set at
some point in time in the sense that harvesting quotas have been set by a
21See also for example, Taylor and Jonkar (1978), Weibull (1995) and Samuelson (1997).
22It should be noted that in this setup the regulator does not optimize with respect to the
choice of auditing probabilities or ﬁnes. Auditing probabilities and ﬁnes take arbitrary
values and the regulator could change them if a speciﬁc compliance level, which is not
attained by the current values of these parameters, is required.
10regulator at the level hC, in response to non-cooperative proﬁt maximizing
harvesting at the level hN. Once these two rules are applied, stock eﬀects
are completely ignored and behavior regarding rule adoption is determined
by the evolution equation (20). This assumption can be thought of as a
situation in which the agents have been “hard wired” at the strategies hN





= γ>0, independent of xN and S. We examine the
evolution of harvesting rules under ﬁxed and variable auditing probabilities.
4.1 Fixed auditing probability
Assume that the auditing probability is ﬁxed as given in (11). Then the
dynamic system (20), (21) becomes:
˙ xN =( 1 − xN)xN
¡
γ − ¯ φF
¢
(22)
˙ S = F (S) − n
£
xNh
N +( 1− xN)h
C¤
(23)
In this case the system (22), (23) has a hierachical structure, so that the
equilibrium of (22) can be determined ﬁrst and then used to determine the
equilibrium of (23).
Since xN ∈ [0,1], it can easily be seen from (22) that there are two
admissible equilibria, x∗
1N =1 ,x ∗
2N =0 . Denote δ =
¡
γ − ¯ φF
¢
, by taking
t h ed e r i v a t i v eo f( 2 2 )w eo b t a i n
d˙ x
dx
= δ(1 − 2x)
Evaluating it at x∗
1N =1 ,x ∗
2N =0 , it follows that
if δ>0 x∗
1N =1is stable, x∗
2N =0 , is unstable
f δ>0 x∗
1N =1is unstable, x∗
2N =0 , is stable
This result can be summarized in the following proposition
Proposition 1 Under precommitment to a ﬁxed auditing probability ¯ φ, the
evolutionary stable equilibrium harvesting rule is monomorphic. All har-
vesters violate regulation if F <γ / ¯ φ. All harvesters follow regulation, that
is, a full compliance equilibrium exists if the ﬁne and the auditing probability
are chosen such that F >γ / ¯ φ.
23Stock eﬀects could be absent if changes in S cause no change in the density of the
stock (Smith 1968).
11Thus the level of that ﬁn ec a nb es e e na sab i f u r c a t i o np a r a m e t e r .T h e r ei s
a critical level Fcr = γ/¯ φ, such that for ﬁnes larger than the critical level the
steady-state equilibrium is characterized by full compliance, while for ﬁnes
less than the critical level no one follows regulation in equilibrium. A similar
role can be played by the auditing probability. In this case ¯ φ
cr = γ/F.24














T h ea p p r o a c hd y n a m i c sa r es h o w ni nF i g u r e1 af o rδ>0, and in ﬁgure 1b for
δ<0 where the ˙ xN =0corresponds to the two isoclines, x∗
1N =1 ,x ∗
2N =0 .




Smsy =a r gm a x S F (s). In ﬁgures 1a and 1b it is assumed that xN (Smsy) > 1,
while in ﬁgure 1c it is assumed that xN (Smsy) < 1,which implies that resource
growth is weak.
[Figure 1]
In ﬁgure 1a, A is stable while B is unstable, with the reverse charac-
terization in ﬁgure 1b. Figure 1d has been drawn under the assumption
that x∗
2N =0is the stable equilibrium. It should be noted that if initial
conditions are such that trajectory Tr 1 is relevant, then the monomorphic
compliance equilibrium is attained. If however trajectory Tr2 is relevant,
then the resource will collapse before equilibrium is reached. This result can
be associated with the timing of introducing regulation, and indicates that
if the resource is already at low levels and largely unregulated, that is, there
is a high proportion of harvesters that do not follow regulation, then a very
strict regulation might not help to prevent resource collapse while a laxer
regulation might have helped if it had been applied when the resource stock
was suﬃciently large.
The results of this section indicate that without a suﬃciently large ﬁne,
the cooperative harvesting rule is not sustainable as a long-run monomorphic
evolutionary equilibrium. Resource extinction is possible even with stringent
regulation if the resource growth is weak and it is applied to low stocks of
a largely unregulated resource. The hypothesis that full compliance can be
24Sutinen et al. (1990) suggest that the high level of noncompliance in the US groundﬁsh
ﬁshery can be explained by low economic sanctions. In terms of our model this observation
agrees with our result that full compliance can be attained by suﬃciently high expected
ﬁnes.
12attained by suﬃciently high expected ﬁnes is supported by ideas developed
through empirical observation. Eggert and Ellerant (2003) claim that the
decision of large scale industrial ﬁshers in Sweden to comply is based mainly
on economic considerations and less on moral obligation or peer pressure.
They suggest that increased compliance can be obtained by "severe economic
consequences of rule violation."
4.2 Compliance dependent auditing probability
In this case the auditing probability is given by (13). Then the dynamic
system (20), (21) becomes:
˙ xN =( 1 − xN)xN [γ − φ(xN)F] (24)
˙ S = F (S) − n
£
xNh
N +( 1− xN)h
C¤
(25)
The system (24), (25) has again a hierarchical structure but there is a possi-
bility of a third equilibrium (24) in addition to x∗
1N =1 ,x ∗
2N =0 .U s i n g( 1 3 )
we have for the function G(xN)=γ − φ(xN)F, that G(0) = γ>0, while
G(1) = γ − φ(1)F. If a combination of γ and F exists such that G(1) < 0,
or to put it diﬀerently, if φ(1) >
γ
F, which is satisﬁed for a suﬃciently large
ﬁne, then G(xN) has a unique zero in the interior of [0,1], which is the third
equilibrium x∗
3N.




=( 1− 2x)[γ − φ(xN)F] − xN (1 − xN)φ
0
(xN)F







−[γ − φ(1)F] > 0 for x∗
1N =1
[γ − φ(0)F] > 0 for x∗
2N =0
−x∗




3N)F < 0 for x∗
3N ∈ (0,1)
The result can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 2 When the auditing probability is compliance dependent and
the ﬁne is suﬃciently large so that a polymorphic equilibrium exists in ad-
dition to the monomorphic equilibria of full compliance and no compliance,
then the polymorphic equilibrium is evolutionary stable while the monomor-
phic equilibria are evolutionary unstable.
13The proposition implies that, for example, announcing after inspection
that everybody is in compliance, does not provide a stable full compliance
state, but creates tendencies for some harvesters not to comply. This is the
result of having φ(0) = 0. If the subjective probability of paying the ﬁne
is zero, then this creates an incentive not to comply and to deviate from
the full compliance state.25 If G(1) = γ − φ(1)F > 0 because the ﬁne
is not suﬃcient, then there is not a third equilibrium in (0,1) and the no
compliance equilibrium is evolutionary stable. By taking the total derivative










Then for a suﬃciently large ﬁne the polymorphic equilibrium could be
close to full compliance.26
Substituting the equilibria of (24) into (25) we obtain the steady state
of the resource stock. The results are shown in ﬁgure 2, where there is
polymorphic stable compliance equilibrium at point C, while points A and
B are unstable monomorphic equilibria.
[Figure 2]
5S t o c k E ﬀects and the Evolution of Harvest-
ing Rules
A more realistic representation of the CPR problems implies that we should
allow for changes in the stock of the biomass to aﬀect the appropriators’ prof-
its, through stock eﬀects in the unit harvesting costs. We maintain, however,
the assumption that there is no smooth dependence of the harvesting rule on
the stock of the biomass. Thus the behavioral assumption regarding the ap-
propriators is that although they realize changes in their proﬁts and associate
these changes with changes in the stock, they stick to their harvesting rule as
long as by sticking to the rule their proﬁts are not suﬃciently below the prof-
its of the harvester with which they randomly match. If individual proﬁts are
suﬃciently below the proﬁts of the other harvester, there is a switch of the
harvesting rule, and the proportion of appropriators following the new rule
starts to increase. Thus appropriators do not continuously adjust their har-
vesting rules to changes in stocks and their individual proﬁts, unless proﬁts
25T h es a m er e s u l th o l d si fφ(0) is small enough so that γ − φ(0)F > 0.
26However with φ(0) = 0 full compliance is not stable.
14accruing from the speciﬁch a r v e s t i n gr u l ef a l ls u ﬃciently short of the proﬁts
of another randomly chosen harvester. In this case the evolutionary system
can be deﬁned as:











˙ S = F (S) − n
£
xNh
N +( 1− xN)h
C¤
(27)
The evolutionary system (26) and (27) is analyzed under two alternative
assumptions regarding the structure of the subjective auditing probability.
Under stock dependent probabilities (12),27 the replicator dynamics (26)
is written as











The isocines corresponding to (26) are deﬁned as x∗
1N =1 ,x ∗
2N =0 , and,



























We assume that ∂πN
∂S − ∂πC
∂S > 0, so that stock eﬀects are relatively stronger
under non-cooperative harvesting rules. Then
∂ψ(S)
∂S > 0 and dS∗
dF > 0. The
steady-state equilibria are shown in Figure 3. The fact that
∂ψ(S)
∂S > 0 implies
that ˙ xN > 0 to the right of S∗, while ˙ xN < 0 to the left of S∗. Therefore the
x∗
1N =1is attracting for S>S ∗ and repelling for S<S ∗.
[Figure 3]
Stock eﬀects introduce one more steady state to the problem, point E in
ﬁgure 3, in addition to the steady-state equilibria A,B,C, and D. Point A in
ﬁgure 3a is locally stable, whereas points B,C, and D are locally unstable.
The critical point E that indicates polymorphic compliance, could, how-
ever, have diﬀerent topological properties than the rest of the critical points.
Point E in ﬁgure 4a is totally unstable, with the directions of the arrows in
the four isosectors around E indicating that the ﬂow of the vector ﬁeld (26),
(27) is pointing outwards around E. If a compact positively invariant region
27Results are qualitatively similar if we consider ﬁxed auditing probabilities.
15R containing E exists, such that the ﬂow of the vector ﬁeld points inwards on
the boundary of R, then according to the Bendixon-Poincare theory, a limit
cycle exists around E as shown by L in ﬁgure 3a.28 The limit cycle might
exist for relatively low resource levels , that is for S∗ <S msy. For S∗ >S msy
the polymorphic equilibrium is stable but the approach path is characterized
by oscillations. These results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Under stock dependent subjective auditing probability and
appropriate values of the ﬁne, a limit cycle indicating oscillating polymor-
phic compliance levels and resource stocks could exist for relatively low re-
source stock levels S∗ <S msy. Under the same conditions, for relatively high
resource stock levels S∗ >S msy, a polymorphic compliance steady-state equi-
librium exists. This steady state could be a stable focus with an approach path
that spiral inwards towards S∗, a stable node without spiraling trajectories,
or a saddle point with a one-dimensional stable manifold.
For Proof see Appendix.
The intuition behind the existence of the limit cycle, with counterclock-
wise movement, goes as follows. For any given point to the southeast of the
limit cycle L, the proportion of appropriators following non-cooperative har-
vesting increases faster than the resource stock. At some point towards the
top of the cycle, stock starts declining but the proportion of appropriators
following non-cooperative harvesting keeps growing, however at a slower rate.
As stock eﬀects become more severe and the auditing probability increases
with the decline of the stock, the proportion of appropriators following non-
cooperative harvesting is declining on the left side of the cycle. The reduc-
tion of the appropriators following non-cooperative harvesting causes stock
recovery. However as stock recovers at the bottom of the cycle, stock eﬀects
become weaker and the auditing probability is declining, therefore the pro-
portion of appropriators following non-cooperative harvesting starts growing
again, and the cycle goes on.
These results indicate that for a relatively low ﬁne level29 such that
S∗ <S msy, and appropriate initial conditions, the system could be trapped
in a low stock area characterized by oscillations. If a large random shock
shifts the system to the left of the region R in ﬁgure 3a, then the resource
might collapse. On the other hand for initial conditions to the right of R the
28See, for example, Sastry (1999, Ch. 2.3). Formally a region R ⊂ R2 is said to be
positively (negatively) invariant for the ﬂow (ζ1t (xN),ζ2t(S)) if, for each (xN,S) ∈ R,
(ζ1t (xN),ζ2t(S)) ∈ R for all t ≥ 0(t ≤ 0). A detailed discussion regarding the existence
of a limit cycle is presented in the Appendix.
29Since dS∗
dF > 0, we expect that low ﬁnes result in S∗ <S msy.
16system converges to the monomorphic no compliance equilibrium at A. What
is worth noting is that this noncompliance equilibrium is characterized by a
larger resource stock than the polymorphic equilibrium on the limit cycle.
This is a result of the fact that to the right of R the proportion of appropri-
ators following non-cooperative harvesting does not grow much faster than
the resource stock, which is necessary for the generation of the limit cycle.
Thus the resource is accumulated at a rate that allows the stock to move
beyond the Smsy.
For relatively high ﬁnes producing S∗ >S msy a polymorphic equilibrium
could have diﬀerent stability properties. For example at point E of ﬁgure
3b the approach path is spiraling inwards towards steady-state equilibrium.
Furthermore, and since dS∗
dF > 0, for a suﬃciently high ﬁne, S∗ could be moved
up to point B in ﬁgure 3b, which corresponds to the dashed line. In this case
the monomorphic noncompliance equilibrium, x∗
1N =1 , is repelling for all
relevant resource stocks. Oscillations in compliance and the resource stock
have been eliminated and there is one stable full compliance equilibrium.
This analysis suggests that under stock eﬀects in costs and auditing prob-
abilities, the CPR could, for relatively low ﬁnes, exhibit periodic oscillations
around a relatively low resource stock, given appropriate initial conditions or
random shocks that could move initial values into the region R. By increas-
ing the ﬁne suﬃciently, a full compliance monomorphic equilibrium can be
attained.
The problem can be analyzed in terms of a more complicated subjective
auditing probability structure with both compliance eﬀects and stock eﬀects.
In this case φ(z)=φ(xN,S) and











The evolutionary system is now given by (30) and (27). The analysis is
basically a combination of the approaches followed above. There is a new
isocine deﬁned as










− φ(xN,S)F =0 (31)
Under appropriate conditions on the functions and the ﬁne, this isocine could
generate two steady states like F and F1 in ﬁgure 2. These steady states are
induced by the dashed line WW,which is the isocine corresponding to (31).
The structure and the properties of the steady states can be analyzed using
the same tools as above. Although the system is more complex, the properties
of the steady states and the policy implications are in general similar to those
derived above.
176 Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this paper was to examine the evolution of harvesting rules for
a CPR which is subject to regulation. The two possible harvesting rules ex-
amined were: (i) a non-cooperative rule, which can be thought of as emerging
from non-cooperative optimization, where the appropriators of the resource
ignore the eﬀects of their actions on the resource stock and the production
set of the others, and (ii) a cooperative rule which can be thought of as
emerging from social welfare optimization, and then used in the form of a
quota for decentralized resource regulation. Appropriators are liable for a
probabilistic ﬁne if they violate regulation. The basic behavioral assumption
is an evolutionary one, namely that the share of appropriators following a
certain rule increases if by sticking to the rule, individual proﬁts increase
relative to average group proﬁts. If individual proﬁts are reduced relative
to average group proﬁts, then some appropriators are expected to switch to
the alternative rule. We combine the evolutionary process of harvesting rule
adoption with biomass dynamics to study the steady-state equilibrium har-
vesting rules, which is equivalent to studying compliance to regulation, and
the corresponding steady-state resource stock.
Our results depend on the structure of the subjective auditing probabil-
ity and whether stock eﬀects on proﬁts are realized or not. The equilibrium
harvesting rule is homogeneous, indicating monomorphic full compliance to
the cooperative harvesting rule or no compliance at all, when auditing prob-
abilities are ﬁxed and stock eﬀects are not present. Without stock eﬀects
but with compliance dependent auditing probabilities and a suﬃciently high
ﬁne, a polymorphic compliance steady state is evolutionary stable, with the
monomorphic states being unstable, while under a low ﬁne the no compli-
ance state is evolutionary stable. In general when the subjective auditing
probability depends on the level of compliance, and this probability tends to
zero when compliance becomes full, then this full compliance state is never
stable.
When stock eﬀects are present there is the possibility that a mix of co-
operative and non-cooperative behavior will be a steady-state equilibrium
outcome. Since stock eﬀects on proﬁts act as a stimulant, the possibility
of a limit cycle in a region of low biomass exists, when subjective auditing
probabilities are stock dependent. In this case there are periodic oscillations
where excess harvesting, lax regulation and low biomass levels are succeeded
by reduced harvesting, more stringent regulation and recovery of stocks. In
our model the mechanism driving periodic oscillations is the interaction be-
tween stock eﬀects on proﬁts, the stringency of regulation measured in terms
of the movements of the subjective auditing probabilities as stocks change,
18and evolutionary adoption of harvesting rules.
Combined stock and regulatory ﬂuctuations, leading to eventual collapse,
have been observed in ﬁsheries. The Canadian cod ﬁshery oﬀ the east coast
of Newfoundland experienced its boom-bust phase in the mid-1950s. With
the appearance of a new breed of factory-ﬁshing, countries such as Germany
(East and West), Great Britain, Spain, Portugal, Poland, the Soviet Union,
Cuba and countries in east Asia had legally ﬁshed to within 12 miles of the
eastern Canadian and New England (US) seaboards. Canada (and the US),
concerned that stocks were being reduced to almost nothing, passed legisla-
tion in 1976 to extend their national jurisdictions over marine living resources
out to 200 nautical miles. Catches naturally declined in the late 1970s and
stocks started recovering after the departure of the foreign ﬂeets. However
national regulation did not set catch quotas at the late 1970s levels, and fur-
thermore new technology in the form of factory-trawlers, or draggers as they
became known, became the mainstay of Canada’s Atlantic oﬀshore ﬁshing
ﬂeet. As a result the northern cod catch began a steady rise again, with a
corresponding decline in stocks. By 1986 the stock decline was realized and
by 1988 there were scientiﬁc opinions recommending that the total allowable
catch be cut in half. Possibly because of delayed regulatory response, by
1992 the biomass estimate for northern cod was the lowest ever measured.
The Canadian Minister of Fisheries and Oceans had no choice but to declare
ab a no nﬁshing northern cod. For the ﬁr s tt i m ei n4 0 0y e a r st h eﬁshing
of northern cod ceased in Newfoundland. The ﬁsheries department issued a
warning in 1995 that the entire northern cod population had declined to just
1,700 tonnes by the end of 1994, down from a 1990 biomass survey showing
400,000 tonnes (Greenpeace 2003).
T h ee v o l u t i o n a r yf r a m e w o r kd e v e l o p e di nt h i sp a p e rc a nb er e g a r d e da s
providing some support for such observed ﬂuctuations in the stocks and the
stringency or eﬀectiveness of regulation.
In terms of our model, oscillations can be eliminated and a full compli-
ance steady state can be achieved by suﬃciently high ﬁnes. If ﬁnes suﬃciently
high to take the CPR out of the trap of low stock oscillations and insuﬃ-
cient compliance are not feasible, because of say political reasons, then such
ﬂuctuations around a low stock will be persistent, and collapse might occur.
Comparing precommitment to auditing and partial commitment to au-
diting, it can be stated that a full compliance equilibrium can be achieved if
the regulator is precommitted to announced ﬁxed auditing probabilities. In
this case there are combinations of ﬁnes/auditing probabilities that could at-
tain the full compliance equilibrium. Thus if the regulator does not have the
complete freedom to adjust ﬁnes due to political reasons the full compliance
result can be achieved by increasing the auditing probability.
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Proof of Proposition 3
On the Existence of a Limit Cycle
We proceed in three steps.
1. First we show that point E in ﬁgure 3a is unstable. The linearization






















0 (S∗) > 0. Thus
tr(J) > 0,D e t (J) > 0. So there are two real positive characteristic
roots and point E is unstable.
2. Then we show that a closed trajectory cannot be ruled out in a simply
connected region,30 like M in ﬁgure 3a, containing the isolated critical
point E. This can be accomplished by using Bendixon’s criterion (Sas-
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does not change sign in a simply connected region containing E. Thus
Bendixon’s criterion implies that a closed trajectory cannot be ruled
out in the region containing E.
3. Finally we construct the positively invariant set R where the ﬂow of the
vector ﬁeld (26), (27) points inwards into R on the boundaries of R as
shown in ﬁgure 3a. More precisely a trapping positively invariant region
like the quadrilateral R can be constructed in the following way. The




˙ xN, ˙ S
´
< 031 where (η1,η 2)
0 is the outward pointing normal
on the boundary of R. Region R is deﬁned by segments of straight lines
xN = k1j + k2jS, j =1 ,2,3,4. The outward pointing normals for the
30A simply connected region is a region that can be (smoothly) contracted to a point.
Thus a simply connected region cannot have more that one "blob" and that blob cannot
have any holes in its interior. See for example Sastry (1999, Ch. 2.3).
31(η1,η2)
0 denotes a column vector.
20lines k1j +k2jS are deﬁned as (η1,η 2)































˙ xN + ˙ S<0 ,j=1 ,2,3,4 (33)
then the vector ﬁeld (26), (27) points inward on the boundary of the
region R. Assume that a region R satisﬁes the above conditions. Then
since E is unstable and it is the only critical point inside R, we can
deﬁne a region like U around E where the ﬂow of the vector ﬁeld (26),
(27) points outwards on the boundary of U. Then by the Bendixon-
Poincare theorem a limit cycle L, exists in region R.
Polymorphic Compliance Equilibrium for S∗ >S msy
We consider the linearization matrix J with F

























Let δ =[ tr(J)]
2−4[Det(J)]. From standard stability analysis of dynamical
systems in two dimensions we have:
















then the steady state is a stable focus.
• If Det(J) > 0,δ>0, then the steady state is a stable node with non
linear trajectory paths.
• If Det(J) < 0, then the steady state is a saddle point.
¥
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